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I. INTRODUCTION 
Louisiana’s curious history with punitive damages can be seen in the 
jurisprudence of cases argued since 1836. Louisiana jurisprudence was 
rooted in a French civil law tradition, which originally shied away from 
awarding punitive damages to victims who suffered wrongs. Unlike fun-
damental civil law jurisdictions, Louisiana is a mixed jurisdiction, which 
borrows heavily from common law tradition. Under common law, the idea 
of punitive damages is wholly embraced. In order to bridge the disconnect 
between the two competing traditions, civil and common law, 
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Louisiana—in keeping with civil law traditions—“refuses to 
allow punitive damages except where authorized by statute.”1 
In 2018, the Louisiana Legislature passed several acts, one 
of which was Act 481, also known as Senate Bill 91.2 Senate 
Bill 91 enacted Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.10, which 
allows a person to collect excessive penalty payments in civil 
lawsuits after someone dies from hazing.3 Another act that 
passed in 2018 by the Louisiana Legislature is Act 635, known 
as House Bill 78.4 House Bill 78 amends and enacts penalties 
relative to the crime of hazing.5 Senate Bill 91 and House Bill 
78 were both inspired and proposed due to the unfortunate 
death of Louisiana State University (LSU) freshman, Max 
Gruver, who died after a night of heavy drinking while pledg-
ing the Phi Delta Fraternity.6 
Fraternities and sororities are college or university student 
organizations formed to promote common social and intellec-
tual interests. They are also called Greek letter social 
 
 1. John W. deGravelles & J. Neale deGravelles, Louisiana Punitive Dam-
ages—A Conflict of Traditions, 70 LA. L. REV. 579 (2010). 
 2. 2018 La. Acts No. 481. See also Wilborn P. Nobles, III, John Bel Ed-
wards signs bill to make hazing a felony act, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, https://perma 
.cc/A68V-TN32.  
 3. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. Art. 2315.10. Liability for death caused by hazing; 
additional damages. In addition to general and special damages, exemplary dam-
ages may be awarded upon proof that the death on which the action is based was 
caused by a wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and safety of the victim 
through an act of hazing, as defined by R.S. 17:1801, regardless of whether the 
defendant was prosecuted for his acts. Acts 2018, No. 481, §1, eff. May 25, 2018. 
 4. 2018 La. Acts No. 481. See also Leigh Guidry, Here’s what you need to 
know about a new hazing law in Louisiana, LOUISIANA DAILY ADVERTISER,  
https://perma.cc/QX5T-W4AH. 
 5. According to LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.8(C)(2)(a) (2018), hazing is 
defined as: 
‘Hazing’ is any intentional, knowing, or reckless act by a person acting 
alone or acting with others that is directed against another when both of 
the following apply: (i) The person knew or should have known that the 
act endangers the physical health or safety of the other person or causes 
severe emotional distress. (ii) The act was associated with pledging, be-
ing initiated into, affiliating with, participating in, holding office in, or 
maintaining membership in any organization. 
 6. Guidry, supra note 4. 




organizations because most of them by tradition name themselves 
using two or three letters taken from the Greek alphabet.7  
Fraternities have a long history of involvement in the practice of haz-
ing going back to the 1800s.8 Socially, hazing is the practice of  “initiating 
new members into a group, often through harassment and humiliation.”9 
It is a bleak American tradition that has endured in the collegiate culture 
for decades.10 While the United States Congress has recognized the seri-
ousness of hazing and has proposed federal anti-hazing legislation, none 
of these proposals have been successful, so states have proposed and 
passed anti-hazing laws.11 
The focus of this paper is to briefly explore the timeline that led to the 
Louisiana Legislature to enact Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:40.8. Then, 
the paper critiques and analyzes Senate Bill 91, specifically focusing on 
the reference in art. 2315.10 to the Louisiana Revised Statutes 17:1801, 
which prohibits hazing.12 It will trace the history of Louisiana jurispru-
dence and try to understand the societal view that allowed the creation of 
the new civil code and the corresponding statute. This statute is important 
because it acts as a new means for victims to expose tortfeasors to punitive 
repercussions by opening up liability to the penalties outlined in Louisiana 
Revised Statutes 14:40.8.13 Therefore, this paper will analyze how the 
Louisiana Legislature uses such statutes to perpetuate civil fines. 
II. BACKGROUND FRAMEWORK 
In Louisiana, there are two forms of damages: compensatory and 
punitive.14 Compensatory damages operate to compensate victims 
 
 7.  Devon M. Alvarez, Death by Hazing: Should there be a Federal Law 
Against Fraternity and Sorority Hazing?, 7 JOURNAL OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY 
RESEARCH 43, 46 (2015). 
 8.  Id.  
 9.  Id. at 43. 
 10.  Id.  
 11.  Id. at 44. 
 12. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:1801 (2018). 
 13. Id. 
 14. David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems 
and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 364 (1994). 




for the loss endured due to the injury that was committed against 
them. Compensatory damages help make the tort victim “whole” 
again, meaning it is an amount of money designed to “place the 
plaintiff in the position she [or he] would have been in if the tort had 
never occurred.”15 On the other hand, punitive damages is the 
amount of money—in addition to compensatory damages—that is 
“designed to punish and deter the defendant and others like [him or] 
her.”16 In keeping with civil law tradition, Louisiana has continually 
advocated and applied a system for compensatory damages.17 Nev-
ertheless, Louisiana operates under a mixed jurisdiction framework 
between civil and common law. The result of such framework 
makes it possible for Louisiana to grant punitive damages for civil 
liability. 
Punitive damages, also referred to as exemplary damages, 
are used to award money to victims for reasons that go beyond 
simple compensation.18 Punitive damages have been a staple of 
the common law for over 200 years,19 but Louisiana’s Civil 
Code of 1808 did not include articles directly addressing or al-
lowing punitive damages.20 However, as early as 1836, the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court approved a jury’s award of punitive dam-
ages, “[d]espite the lack of a specific statutory basis.”21 This 
trend of awarding punitive damages despite the lack of statutory 
authorization occurred at least ten times between the years 1836 
 
 15. Maraist, Church, Corbett, Galligan, Richard & Flannagan, TORT LAW: 
THE AMERICAN AND LOUISIANA PERSPECTIVES, 419 (3d ed., Vandeplas 2017).  
 16. Id. 
 17. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315(A) (2017): “Every act whatever of man 
that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair 
it.” This article provides the legal basis for civil liability for damages suffered due 
to another person’s actions. 
 18. James E. Bolin Jr., Enter Exemplary Damages, 32 LA. B.J. 216, 217 
(1984). Louisiana statutes use the term “exemplary” rather than “punitive” dam-
ages. The two terms are used interchangeably, but they have different connota-
tions. The term “punitive” emphasizes the goal of punishment, while the term 
“exemplary” emphasizes the goal of making an example of the wrongdoer for 
purposes of education and deterrence. 
 19. deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 1, at 581. 
 20. Id. at 582. 
 21. Id. at 583. 




and 1917.22 Over time, some courts felt the need to justify their 
decisions based on a statutory authorization for the award. The 
justification initially rested on Louisiana Civil Code article 
1928 (now 2324.1), wherein states: “[I]n the assessment of 
damages in cases of offenses, quasi offenses, and quasi con-
tracts, much discretion must be left to the judge or jury.”23 
While the concept under modern civil law has been that puni-
tive damages “violate the purpose behind the law of damages,” 
Louisiana courts have not been faithful to the idea that all dam-
ages should only be compensatory in nature.24  
III. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
The doctrine of punitive damages, also known as exemplary 
damages, “was first developed in the eighteenth-century common 
law of England,”25 but punitive damages have an ancient origin.26 
Ancient Roman civil law,27 the Twelve Tables of 450 B.C., and the 
Babylonian Code of Hammurabi,28 which is about 4000 years old, 
calculated compensation in ways that included a punitive element.29 
The English common law punitive damages doctrine was carried 
over to the common law courts of the United States by 1784.30  
 
 22. Id. 
 23. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1928 (1825) (now LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 
2324.1 (2017)). 
 24. deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 1, at 580. 
 25. C. Caldwell Herget Huckabay, The Insurability of Punitive Damages in 
Louisiana, 48 LA. L. REV. 1161, 1162 (1988). 
 26. John Y. Gotanda, Punitive Damages: A Comparative Analysis, WORKING 
PAPER SERIES (2003), https://perma.cc/NKJ5-FTMN. 
 27. Roman law acknowledged early on that a wrongdoer is liable to make 
payments to his or her victim for an amount beyond the actual harm incurred. The 
Twelve Tables of 450 B.C. provided multiple examples of damages, “in the form 
of fixed money payments, such as where a party failed to carry out a promise.” 
Jason Taliadoros, The Roots of Punitive Damages at Common Law: A Longer 
History, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 251, 279 (2016). 
 28. In the Code of Hammurabi, multiple damages, which are synonymous 
with punitive damages, were “payable for offences, such as stealing cattle…or a 
common carrier failing to deliver goods.” Taliadoros, supra note 27, at 278. 
 29. deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 1, at 580. 
 30. Id. at 582. 




From its history of having been a French and Spanish colony, the 
territory that became the State of Louisiana ultimately retained the civil 
law, at least regarding the substance of its private law.31 The modern 
civil law view towards punitive damages is that it violates the 
purpose behind the law of damages, which is to repair the harm 
sustained by the victim of a wrong, and not to punish the wrong-
doer, the latter being the task of criminal law.32 Nevertheless, 
punitive damages became a widely accepted concept in America 
during the nineteenth century,33 a practice that percolated in 
Louisiana in spite of its civil law heritage. References to puni-
tive damages can be found in Louisiana as far back as the 1836 
case of Summers v. Baumgard, which involved wrongful sei-
zure.34 In Summers v. Baumgard, the court stated that the de-
fendant should be assessed punitive damages by reasoning:  
The necessity of seizing the horse and dray in the first in-
stance, in order to get possession of his truant apprentice 
boy, is not very obvious; but the detention of them after re-
peated demands, and the offer on the part of the plaintiff to 
give him ample security to make good any damage for which 
he might be justly liable, evince such an obstinate determi-
nation on the part of the defendant to take justice into his 
own hands, as fully authorized the jury to make him pay 
something in the shape of smart money.35 
The jurisprudential trend of awarding punitive damages in Lou-
isiana continued in the 1887 case of Dirmeyer v. O’Hern. In this 
case, the jury awarded the plaintiff $500, a sum in excess of the 
 
 31. For a full discussion, see JOHN W. CAIRNS, CODIFICATION, TRANSPLANTS 
AND HISTORY, LAW REFORM IN LOUISIANA (1808) AND QUEBEC (1866), 53-58 
(Talbot 2015); Donald C. Massey & Martin A. Stern, Punitive Damages and the 
Louisiana Constitution: Don’t Leave Home Without It, 56 LA. L. REV. 743, 769 
(1996). 
 32. Helmut Koziol, Punitive Damages—A European Perspective, 68 LA. L. 
REV. 741, 744 (2008); deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 1, at 580. 
 33. deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 1, at 582. 
 34. Huckabay, supra note 25, at 1162. 
 35. Punitive damages are sometimes referred to as “smart money.” See Sum-
mers v. Baumgard, 9 La. 161, 162 (1836); see also Huckabay, supra note 25, at 
1162. 




compensatory damages the plaintiff sustained.36 The Louisiana 
Supreme Court articulated that “these additional damages, thus 
found, are likewise called vindictive damages, which a judge or 
jury may inflict under a just sense of indignation for the wrong 
done . . . .”37  
However, in 1917 the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to 
award punitive damages in the case of Vincent v. Morgan’s L. & 
T. R. & S. S. Co.38 The case centered around the killing of the 
plaintiffs’ child by a railroad employee. In their reasoning, the 
court stated:  
Our conclusion therefore is that under our law as it now 
stands the right of action for the recovery of damages for 
personal injury, sustained through the fault of another, is 
personal to the injured party . . . but that neither the per-
son originally injured nor those who succeed to his right 
with respect thereto, and who acquire rights of their own 
with respect to the injury inflicted upon them by his 
death, are entitled to recover anything more in the way of 
damages than adequate indemnity for the injury and loss 
inflicted upon him . . . .39 
Almost 100 years later, from the 1836 case of Summers v. 
Baumgard, the Louisiana Supreme Court succinctly articulated 
the state’s position regarding punitive damages in the 1932 case 
of McCoy v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co. In the McCoy case, the 
court stated that “[t]here is no authority in the law of Louisiana 
for allowing punitive damages in any case, unless it be for some 
particular wrong for which a statute expressly authorizes the im-
position of some such penalty.”40 This statement represents the 
current position of Louisiana state law. 
 
 36. Dirmeyer v. O’Hern, 39 La. Ann. 961, 3 So. 132, 133 (1887). 
 37. Id. at 134. 
 38. Vincent v. Morgan’s L. & T. R. & S. S. Co., 140 La. 1027, 74 So. 541 
(1917). 
 39. Id. at 549. 
 40. McCoy v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 175 La. 487, 497; 143 So. 383, 385-
86 (1932). 




IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES, A SOCIETAL VIEW 
Today, there is a wide array of statutes awarding punitive dam-
ages in Louisiana courts for a variety of circumstances.41 Newly en-
acted into this array of statutes is Louisiana Civil Code article 
2315.10.42 As previously mentioned, punitive damages are used to 
award money to victims for reasons that go beyond simple compen-
satory damages.43 Punitive damages are used to punish and deter the 
defendant.44 Specifically, in Mosing v. Domas, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court articulated the purpose of punitive damages as, “pun-
ishing the defendant, of teaching the defendant not to do [the repre-
hensible bad act] again, and of deterring others from following the 
defendant’s example.”45 However, while deterrence was originally 
a major goal of the statutory establishment of punitive damages in 
Louisiana civil law, deterrence has given way to punishment being 
the driving force of effectuating punitive damages. 
 
 41. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.3 (2017) (allowing punitive dam-
ages upon proof that injuries were caused by a wanton and reckless disregard for 
the rights and safety of the person through an act of pornography involving juve-
niles); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.4 (2017) (allowing punitive damages upon 
proof that injuries were caused by a wanton and reckless disregard for the rights 
and safety of others by a defendant whose intoxication while operating a motor 
vehicle was a cause in fact of the resulting injuries); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 
2315.7 (2017) (allowing exemplary damages for criminal sexual activity upon 
proof that the injuries were caused by a wanton and reckless disregard for the 
rights and safety of the person when the victim was seventeen years old or 
younger); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.76 (2017) (specific ally allowing exem-
plary damages upon proof that the sale or distribution of an illegal controlled sub-
stance or participation in the marketing of an illegal controlled substance was in 
wanton or reckless disregard for the health and safety of others); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 22:1811 (2017) (allowing for an eight percent interest penalty on the 
amount due under a life insurance policy if not paid within 60 days after proof of 
death is rendered); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1973(C) (2017) (allowing punitive 
damages against the insurer in an amount not to exceed two times the damages 
sustained or five thousand dollars); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1409 (2017) (al-
lowing for punitive damages in the amount of three times the actual damages sus-
tained in the event that a person suffers a loss of money or movable property if 
the court finds an unfair or deceptive method, act, or practice was knowingly used, 
by a person after being put on notice by the attorney general). 
 42.  LA. CIV. CODE ANN. Art. 2315.10, supra note 3. 
 43.  Bolin Jr. supra note 18. 
 44.  deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 1, at 588. 
 45.  Mosing v. Domas, 830 So. 2d 967, 978 (La. 2002). 




For years, the private law has been unable to sufficiently deter 
reprehensible behavior. Consider the underlying facts in Mosing v. 
Domas; this was a personal injury case about a man who was seri-
ously injured when he was struck by a drunk driver. The defendant 
drunk driver had previously been cited for multiple Driving While 
Intoxicated (DWI) violations in the past and at the time of the inci-
dent with the plaintiff, the defendant was fleeing from an earlier hit 
and run accident that he had caused. Furthermore, several previous 
incidents showed not only the defendant’s recidivism, but also his 
total lack of remorse.46 The court in Mosing discussed multiple fac-
tors that drive the amount of punitive damages awarded against a 
defendant. Some of the factors included: the extent of harm or po-
tential harm caused by the defendant’s misconduct, whether the de-
fendant acted in good faith, whether the misconduct was an individ-
ual instance or part of a pattern, whether the defendant behaved 
recklessly or maliciously, and even the wealth of the defendant.47 
Some of these factors enter the exclusive realm of punishment rather 
than deterrence; for example: “[W]hether the misconduct was an in-
dividual instance or part of a pattern.”48 As noted, the defendant in 
Mosing, had several prior DWI infractions. None of the prior penal-
ties given to him effectively deterred his behavior.49 If the defendant 
cannot reasonably be deterred by reasonable punishment, then what 
can be done about the tortfeasor? Have Louisiana courts effectively 
 
 46. In this case, the defendant was ordered to pay $500,000 in exemplary 
damages. On subsequent appeal, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that “the 
jury did not abuse its discretion in awarding the plaintiffs $500,000.00 in exem-
plary damages.” Id. at 970. 
 47. Id. at 974. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 980: 
On April 6, 1989, Domas was ticketed for operating a vehicle while in-
toxicated . . . . On May 1, 1990, a few weeks later . . . Deputy Menard, 
[] arrested him for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, second offense, 
and driving under a suspended license . . . . July 29, 1990, Domas was 
arrested again, this time for operating a motor vehicle in the City of Lafa-
yette with an open container of alcoholic beverage in the vehicle. On 
August 22, 1990, less than two weeks prior to the incident giving rise to 
this litigation, Domas appeared in court and pleaded guilty to second of-
fense DWI. 




chosen to simply punish the tortfeasor by an award of damages ex-
cessively exceeding compensation, imposing a sort of civil fine, 
convinced that reasonable punishment by criminal courts offers in-
sufficient deterrence? Are these civil fines simply criminal penalties 
masquerading under the guise of punitive damages for which quasi-
criminal conduct can be sufficiently punished? 
V. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Consider the recently enacted Senate Bill 91.50 Senate Bill 
91 creates potential problems with the enactment of Louisiana Civil 
Code art. 2315.10. Under civil law, a person can be sued for dam-
ages in a civil court in ordinary civil actions. The burden of proof in 
such civil cases is that the plaintiff must establish their case by a 
preponderance of the evidence,51 which means that the fact sought 
to be proved is more probable than not.52 However, the law distin-
guishes between two degrees of proof. In civil cases, the proof is by 
a preponderance of the evidence. The more probable than not stand-
ard requires only a determination that can be met with a simple prob-
ability that the fact in question is at least over 50% true.53 In criminal 
court, the degree of proof is understandably greater.  
The degree of proof in criminal court is called “proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”54 It is the heaviest burden of persuasion. Under 
this standard of proof, guilt must be “so highly probable as to banish 
all reasonable doubts.” Therefore, the evidence must eliminate any 
doubt based upon fair reason.55 The consequence of this standard of 
proof is that the trier of fact should believe that the defendant’s 
guilt is almost certain. So how does this relate to Senate Bill 91? 
 
 50. La. Acts No. 481, supra note 4. 
 51. Joe W. Sanders, The Anatomy of Proof in Civil Actions, 28 LA. L. REV. 
297, 298 (1968). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 303-4. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 305. 




As previously stated, Senate Bill 91 enacted Louisiana Civil 
Code art. 2315.10. This articles states that:  
In addition to general and special damages, exemplary dam-
ages may be awarded upon proof that the death on which the 
action is based was caused by a wanton and reckless disre-
gard for the rights and safety of the victim through an act of 
hazing, as defined by R.S. 17:1801, regardless of whether 
the defendant was prosecuted for his acts.56  
Violation of art. 2315.10 is a civil offense, therefore if a per-
son has violated this article, they may be subject to a lawsuit in 
civil court and, as previously stated, the burden of proof in civil 
court is proof by a preponderance of the evidence, or more prob-
able than not. Furthermore, since part of article 2315.10 depends 
on Louisiana Revised Statutes 17:1801, one must look to the 
definition of hazing as defined in 17:1801.57 Moreover, under 
17:1801 a person in violation of this statute “may also be subject 
to the provisions of R.S. 14:40.8 which provides penalties for 
certain hazing activities.”58 Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:40.8 
is a criminal statute, so violation of this statute would subject a 
person to punishment in criminal court and as previously stated 
the burden of proof in a criminal proceeding is proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, or near certainty of guilt. Before further dis-
cussion into the problem with civil code article 2315.10, a con-
versation about how this statute potentially affects constitutional 
law is outlined below. 
 
 56. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. Art. 2315.10, supra note 3. 
 57. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:1801(D)(1)(a) (2018): 
D. For purposes of this Section and R.S. 17:1801.1:  
(1)(a) “Hazing” means any intentional, knowing, or reckless act by a per-
son acting alone or acting with others that is directed against another 
when both of the following apply: 
(i) The person knew or should have known that such an act endangers 
the physical health or safety of the other person or causes severe emo-
tional distress. 
(ii) The act was associated with pledging, being initiated into, affiliating 
with, participating in, holding office in, or maintaining membership in 
any organization. 
 58. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:1801(B) (2018). 




 VI. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
In determining whether the Louisiana punitive damage codal 
provisions, such as art. 2315.10, are quasi-criminal in their effect, 
this section addresses two issues. First, this section provides an over-
view of the Eighth Amendment, specifically its prohibition of “ex-
cessive fines.”59 Second, this section compares the Eighth Amend-
ment issue with the present-day application and effects of certain 
punitive damage articles in Louisiana, specifically the recently en-
acted Senate Bill 91 and House Bill 78, which prohibits hazing to a 
new heightened level.  
The Eighth Amendment states that: “Excessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual pun-
ishments inflicted.”60 Paying close attention to the bar against “ex-
cessive fines,” what constitutes excessive? In the context of civil 
fines, the Supreme Court in Rex Trailer Co. v. United States stated 
that if the goal is to punish the defendant, then a sanction that was 
intended as a civil remedy can be transformed into a criminal pen-
alty, so that may constitute excessive.61 Yet, 33 years later in Brown-
ing-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, the court stated, in a seven to 
two vote, that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against exces-
sive fines “does not apply to awards of punitive damages in cases 
between private parties.”62 However, Rex Trailer Co. v. United 
States has never explicitly been overruled. So, where does that leave 
punitive damages today? Well, the issue may be complicated. Jus-
tice O’Connor notes in her Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Dis-
posal dissent, of her concerns about the skyrocketing rate of punitive 
damages.63 She states: 
The Court holds today that the Excessive Fines Clause of 
the Eighth Amendment places no limits on the amount of 
 
 59. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154, 76 S. Ct. 219 (1956). 
 62. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 109 S. Ct. 2909 
(1989). 
 63. Id. at 2923. 




punitive damages that can be awarded in a suit between pri-
vate parties. That result is neither compelled by history nor 
supported by precedent, and I therefore respectfully dissent 
from Part II of the Court’s opinion.64 
From a textualist standpoint, Justice O’Connor’s concern is un-
doubtably substantiated. The term “excessive fine” does not indicate 
any clear intent to preclude its application to punitive damages. Only 
through a lens of originalism and the Eighth Amendment’ inextrica-
ble tie to criminal law does the court in Browning-Ferris Indus. v. 
Kelco Disposal come to its ultimate conclusion. Nevertheless, if Rex 
Trailer Co. v. United States is still “good law,” then civil penalties 
made to punish the defendant can be, and maybe should be, treated 
as criminal penalties as to trigger the application of the Excessive 
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.  
Consider the recently enacted Senate Bill 91 and House Bill 78. 
Senate Bill 91 and House Bill 78 were passed by the Louisiana Leg-
islature during the 2018 regular session. Senate Bill 91 enacted Lou-
isiana Civil Code article 2315.1065 and House Bill 78 amended Lou-
isiana Revised Statutes 17:1801 and enacted Louisiana Revised 
Statutes 14:40.8.66 Article 2315.10 makes reference to Louisiana 
Revised Statutes 17:1801, a civil statute that prohibits hazing in any 
form in any educational institution “supported wholly or in part by 
public funds”67 and subjects those who violate the provisions of 
17:1801 to the penalties for certain hazing activities outlined in Lou-
isiana Revised Statutes 14:40.8, a criminal statute.68 Interestingly 
enough, the language defining hazing and the activities that consti-
tute hazing are almost identical in both statutes,69 even though one 
 
 64. Id. at 2924. 
 65. La. Acts No. 481, supra note 4. 
 66. 2018 La. Acts No. 635. 
 67. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:1801(A) (2018). 
 68. Id. at § 17:1801(B). 
 69. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:1801(D)(1)(b)(i) with LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 14:40.8(C)(2)(b)(i): 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:1801(D)(1)(b)(i): ‘Hazing’ includes but is not 
limited to any of the following acts associated with pledging, being ini-
tiated into, affiliating with, participating in, holding office in, or 




statute is under Title 17, which deals with education and the other 
statute is under Title 14, which governs criminal law. It is clear that 
violation of the criminal law under Title 14 automatically subjects 
one to punitive damages under Title 17 since the burden of proof in 
criminal cases is higher than civil cases. How would such a system 
work out in a real-world example? 
VII. AN APPLICATION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES  
Given that the definitions of hazing are almost identical in na-
ture,70 violation of Title 14 hazing is likely to constitute a violation 
of Title 17 hazing, so one may be subject to punitive damages under 
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.10. How would this system work 
out in a real-world hypothetical? Take for example student, ‘Adam.’ 
Hypothesize that Adam is in violation of Louisiana Revised 
Statutes 14:40.8; this statute provides criminal penalties for the 
crime of hazing.71 Under this law, Adam may be subject to jail time 
but also to a fine of up to $1000, and if the hazing resulted in the 
serious bodily injury or death of the victim, then the perpetrator 
would be subject to a fine of up to $10,000 and imprisonment. Adam 
is prosecuted and convicted in criminal court, with a burden of proof 
that is beyond a reasonable doubt, of the crime of hazing and he is 
ordered to pay a fine of $1000, but no jail time. Adam is now auto-
matically subject to violation of Louisiana Revised Statutes 17:1801 
and is subject to civil penalties, also known as punitive damages, 
 
maintaining membership in any organization: (i) Physical brutality, such 
as whipping, beating, paddling, striking, branding, electric shocking, 
placing of a harmful substance on the body, or similar activity. 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.8(C)(2)(b)(i): ‘Hazing’ includes but is not 
limited to any of the following acts associated with pledging, being ini-
tiated into, affiliating with, participating in, holding office in, or main-
taining membership in any organization: (i) Physical brutality, such as 
whipping, beating, paddling, striking, branding, electronic shocking, 
placing of a harmful substance on the body, or similar activity. 
Compare also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:1801(D)(1)(a), supra note 57 with LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.8(C)(2)(a), supra note 5. 
 70. Id. 
 71. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.8 (2018). 




that have no constitutional limit to their amount. How and why is 
this fair, especially given Louisiana’s roots in French law, which 
originally shied away from punitive damages? If criminal law be-
lieves that Adam was sufficiently punished/deterred with a $1000 
fine, is it necessary to subject him to yet another fine? Is this system 
just set up to further punish the tortfeasor?  
Let us now change the hypothetical a little. Adam is prosecuted 
for his violation of Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:40.8 but is not 
convicted in criminal court. He is again subject to civil action under 
17:1801, and since civil court has a lower burden of proof, Adam is 
easily found liable and is under no constitutional limit for the exem-
plary damages he may have to pay. Is this how the civil law system 
should work?  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Senate Bill 91 and House Bill 78, also known as The Max 
Gruver Act, is named after 18-year-old Louisiana State University 
(LSU) freshman, Max Gruver, who tragically passed away from a 
hazing incident on campus. Before the Max Gruver Act became law, 
the maximum penalty for hazing in Louisiana, was 30 days in jail 
and a $100 fine, and there were no exemplary damages specifically 
awarded for hazing violations.72 However, as the law stands now, 
the criminal penalty for hazing carries a fine of up to $10,000 and 
imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for up to five years.73 
With the enactment of article 2315.10, the amendment of Louisiana 
Revised Statutes 17:1801 is referenced and 17:1801 references 
newly enacted Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:40.8. Therefore, 
through article 2315.10, can it be said that the mere punishment of 
defendants for hazing infractions is essentially the goal of article 
2315.10? Is article 2315.10 even necessary or is it just another tool 
used to punish those who may or may not slip through the cracks of 
 
 72. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:1801 (2017). 
 73. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. Art. 2315.10, supra note 3. 




criminal prosecution? One is inclined to believe that the answer is 
yes, particularly due to the fact that article 2315.10 provides that 
exemplary damages may be awarded “regardless of whether the de-
fendant was prosecuted for his acts.”74 If this assumption is credible, 
does the fact that Rex Trailer Co. v. United States is still considered 
“good law” support the finding that the article 2315.10, by virtue of 
Louisiana Revised Statutes 17:1801, is just a criminal penalty mas-
querading under the guise of civilian punitive damages? The an-
swers to these questions may be revealed sometime in the near fu-
ture as more civil and criminal lawsuits are filed, which essentially 
stemmed from the lawsuit filed by the parents of the slain LSU 
freshman, Max Gruver. The Gruvers’ filed a $25 million lawsuit 
shortly after the enactment of the Max Gruver Act.75  
Furthermore, in February of 2019, several students from the 
LSU chapter of Delta Kappa Epsilon (DKE) fraternity were arrested 
on hazing related charges. Subsequently, the national organization 
of Delton Kappa Epsilon (DKE) closed its LSU chapter.76 Since 
these DKE fraternity students were charged after the enactment of 




 74. Id. 
 75. Associated Press, Parents of fraternity pledge sue after son’s hazing 
death, New York Post (Aug. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/8WFL-WUTC. 
 76. Associated Press, 9 Louisiana State University fraternity members ar-
rested on hazing-related charges, Fox 8 Cleveland (Feb. 15, 2019), https://perma 
.cc/SC4K-NZ6Z. 
